

ADVICE

Given to the
Republick of VENICE.

How they ought to Govern themselves both at home and abroad, to have perpetual Dominion.

First Written in *Italian* by that Great Politician and Lover of his Countrey, Father *PAUL* the *Venetian*, Author of the Council of *Trent*.

Translated into English by
Dr. *AGLIONBY*.

Dedicated to his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of *Ireland*.

L O N D O N,

Printed for *Christopher Nobber*, at the Sign of the *Olive-Tree*, in the Inner-Walk above stairs in the *New Exchange*, 1693.

D. M. C.

1877

TO HIS
EXCELLENCY
HENRY,

Viscount Sydney,

*Lord Lieutenant of Ireland,
Gentleman of the Bed-
Chamber to Their Majesties,
and one of Their Majesties
most Honourable Privy-Coun-
cil.*

My Lord,

Though your design'd
Favours to me might
justly claim this offer
of my Respects in a Dedicati-
on, yet I must own, That it is

The Epistle Dedicatory.

not only Gratitude that requires me to make this return, but it is my Choice and Judgment that prompts me to take the Liberty of putting this Piece under your Protection. And indeed, if I regard either the Greatness of your Family, or your own Personal Endowments, where could I have found a more Illustrious Name, or a more generally own'd Deserr.

The Sydneys have fill'd our *English* History, and adorn'd our Nation; Great in Employments both at Home and Abroad, but more Glorious in asserting constantly their Country's true Interest:

And

The Epistle Dedicatory.

And your Lordship has not been wanting to follow such Honourable Examples, first, by a steddy adherence to all the measures that could be entred into by a wise man in times full of dark designs; and then (as soon as your Countries Good requir'd it) by boldly laying aside all dubious Counsels, to appear in Arms with our Great and Glorious Deliverer, His Present Majesty.

Amongst the Thanks we owe to all those who have done the like, I think no one can more justly be extoll'd by this, or recommended to the esteem and admirati-

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on of the next Age, than
your Lordship.

In your Negotiation in
Holland, during the close In-
trigues of the latter end of
King *Charles* his Reign, you
strove to keep both him and
us happy and quiet, by pro-
moting the true Interest of
both: But when the Ferment
of our Affairs forc'd you to
more sensible demonstrations
of your thoughts, you No-
bly chose rather to appear an
ill Courtier, than be thought
an ill Man to your Country.
The Protestant Interest carri-
ed it with you, while the *Ro-*
man Faction thought their
designs as secure as they
were

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were deeply laid. 'Tis rare to find such Conduct and Courage in a Publick Minister: But what could be expected less from one ready to venture his Life in the Field at the Head of our Nation abroad, against that unquiet Monarch who was then invading all the Liberty Mankind had left.

Heaven, My Lord, has at last bless'd these constant endeavours for *England's* Prosperity, and we see you in the Councils and Privacy of a Prince born for our Felicity.

The Great Queen of this Monarchy, who so lov'd her

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People, and understood their Interest, had a Sydney for her Favourite, and such a man as she admir'd living, and lamented dead; and our King, who has begun with restoring this Nation to its true Interest, and will, no question, advance its Glory to the highest pitch, has your Lordship in his Councils and Arms, Guarded by you in the day, he sleeps often under your care in the Night, safe in your Loyalty, and pleas'd in your attendance.

To whom then could I more properly offer these *Ar-
canums* of a Wise Govern-
ment, than to one who must
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be a good Judge of all Writings of that kind; and therefore with repeated Offers of my humble Respects, and readiness to obey your Lordship's Commands, I take leave, and am,


My Lord,

Your Lordship's

Most Humble and most

Devoted Obedient Servant,

W. Aglionby.



T H E
P R E F A C E.

T*Hat Padre Paulo Sarpi, of the Order of the Servites, is the Author of this Treatise, there needs no other proof than the reading of it; for whoever is acquainted either with his style, or his manner of thinking, must of necessity acknowledge, that they are both here. And indeed we may say, that this is not only a true representation of the Government of the Venetian Republick, but that the Author also (like great Painters;*

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ers, who in all their Works give us their own Genius with the mixture of the Representation) has likewise drawn the truest Picture of himself. He was one of the greatest men of his Age, of vast Natural Parts, to which he had added all the acquir'd ones that great Study and much Conversation with Men could give him: It was he who defended the Republick in the dispute they had with Pope Paul the 5th; which he did so solidly, and yet so modestly, that his Subject never carried him either to Invectives or Railleries, unbeseeming the Gravity of the Matter, nor the Dignity of the Persons whose Cause he managed; that Quarrel being
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accommodated by the interposition of the Kings of France and Spain, in which the Republick had all the advantage possible : The Senate, very sensible of the Obligation they had to P. Paulo, made him Consultor of State, and added an Honourable Pension for his Life, giving him at the same time Order to view all their secret Records, where all their Papers and Instruments of State were laid up ; all which he reduc'd into such a new order, as that they might be recurr'd to with the greatest ease imaginable upon all occasions. The Esteem they made of his Abilities was so great, that they never had any important debate in which either
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by publick order, or by the private application of some of their Senators, they did not take his advice; which most commonly was assented to afterwards. Towards the latter end of his Life, the Inquisitors of State seeing that they could not hope long for the continuation of those Oracles, resolv'd, that once for all he should impart them his thoughts upon the whole Constitution of their Government, and withal, add his Opinion touching their Future Conduct both within and without; and that is this Piece with which I now present the Publick. As it was made for the perusal of those only who were the participants of all the Arcanums of the Empire,
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it is writ with less regard to the Publick Censure, to which he suppos'd it would never be subject. All other Writers of Politicks may in one thing be justly suspected, which is, that when they write with a design of publishing their Works to Mankind, they must have a regard to many considerations both of the times they write in, and Opinions that are then receiv'd by the People, as also to the Establish'd Forms both of Government and Religion; besides that Self-love too will not let them forget their own Glory, for the sake of which they often swerve from the true Rules of writing; but here all these considerations ceas'd; the Work is directed

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rected to those whose Interest it was to conceal it: And for the Author himself, it may be said, it was rather his Legacy than any desire of shewing his Abilities, which by other Pieces of his were already sufficiently publish'd to the World. But what an Idea must we have of that Man whom a Venetian Senate not only admitted to their Debates, but consulted upon the whole Frame of their Government; a Senate, I say, justly deserving the Titles of Wise and Great; who have maintain'd their State for 1200 years, with little alteration; who have been a Bulwark to the Christian World against the most potent Invader that ever was; who at the same
time

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time have struggled with all the Christian Princes united, and headed, even by Popes, whose spiritual power alone has been able to subvert greater Empires: This Senate, or at least the wisest of them, the Inquisitors of State, who have the whole Executive Power in their hands, cannot let this Subject of theirs leave the World without having from him a Scheme of their present Affairs, and a prospect of the Occurrences to come: Nothing certainly can give us a greater Idea of Padre Paulo, nor shew us how great Abilities in the most retired and concealed Subjects, will break out in all wise Governments, and cannot long be conceal'd.

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As to the work it self, I shall say little, it being improper to forestall the Reader's Judgment by mine; but I think I may venture to give him some cautions against a surprise, from some bold Maxims and arbitrary Positions which he will meet with, and perhaps not expect from one of our Author's Profession, nor in the Methods of a Government which carries the specious and popular Title of Liberty in the Head of it. As to the Author, tho he were a religious man, and a very strict observer of that Life; yet being above ordinary methods, and having a Mind elevated beyond his sphere, he thought, that not only he might, but that he ought to go

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to the Extent of his Capacity, when he was to advise those whom God Almighty had invested with Sovereign Power. This makes him lay down that great Maxim, That all is just that contributes to the preservation of the Government; and in a natural deduction from this, advise in some cases not to stand upon common proceedings. I remember the Author of his Life says, That he had adapted most of the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, about the Diseases and Cure of the Body natural, to those of the Body politick; and if so, he could not forget that of,

*Extremis Morbis extrema
Remedia,*

which alone would warrant all uncommon proceedings.

Most

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*Most people have an Idea of Commonwealths, not unlike that which Poets and young people have of the Golden Age, where they fancy, that without either labour, solicitude, or chagrin, people pass their time in the Innocent Pleasures of Love and Musick, and other soft Delights; so the World imagines, that a Popular Government is all sweetness and liberty, precarious, and depending upon their Votes, free from oppression and slavery, and constant to known methods: but all this is a very wrong Conception; they are invested with Sovereign Power, and must and do use it for their own preservation, as absolutely as any Sovereign Prince in
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the World; and whoever shall seriously consider the Machine of this Venetian State, must own, that neither the Governors themselves, nor the people governed by them, have any such Excellent and Inviting Prerogatives, as can justly give them a Superiority to the Government of a wise Prince, and well dispos'd People in a limited Monarchy. But I have said enough of this; the Reader will best judge, whether the reading of this Book will enamour him of a Republican Government or not.


I have no more to say, but that this is a very faithful Translation from an Original Manuscript communicated to me in Italy, where

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where it begins to creep abroad ; and if we had in England the conveniency of Workmen that could Print Italian correctly, I would have publish'd both the Original and my Translation together.

The words of Quarantie and Avogadore, may puzzle some people ; but they will easily understand, that the first is a kind of Bench of Judges deligated out of the Body of the lesser Nobility, for the Trial of Civil and some Criminal Causes ; and the other is the Name of a great Magistrate in Venice, who among other Priviledges, has that of carrying the Sentences of the Council of Ten before the great Council.

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THE
OPINION
OF
Padre Paolo,

*Most Illustrious and Excellent Lords,
the Inquisitors of State,*

I Write by Obedience to your Lordship's Commands, without Reflection upon my own small Abilities, because the Chief Consideration of a Subject ought to be to obey his Prince.

Your Excellencies have commanded me to deliver my Opinion,
B on,

on, how the *Venetian Republick* ought to regulate it self, to hope for a perpetual Duration. To obtain a true Notion of this, it will be necessary to distinguish, and first to regulate the Government of the City, in which will be comprehended the manner of keeping the Nobles and the Citizens to their Duty; then look abroad to the rest of your Dominions: and lastly give some Form to the dealing with Foreign Princes.

To begin with the *First*, I might in short put you in mind of the Saying of St. *Bernardino* of *Siena*, to the *Doge Moro*, who said, That the Republick should continue so long as they should keep to the Rule of doing Exact Justice; but to come nearer to the matter, and the Condition of these Times, we must reduce under that Head of Justice, all that contributes to the Service of the State; and, to speak yet more succinctly, we will lay it
down

down as a Maxim , *That all is just which is any ways necessary for the maintaining of the Government.*

In the particular Government of the City, 'tis an excellent Custom to lay the Impositions as well upon the Nobility , as the rest of the Citizens. *First* , Because the Burden is less when it is general : And , *Secondly* , Because 'tis just when 'tis without Partiality. There is no doubt but it lessens something of the Splendor of the Nobility to see them tax'd particularly , since in many Governments the Nobility and Gentry, though they are Subjects, and not part of the Government, do nevertheless enjoy a Freedom from Taxes, and contribute more with their Sword than Purse, towards the Publick Charge : But since the Ancient Simplicity of our Ancestors has patiently submitted to this Yoak ; and because the Priviledges of the Sword are dan-

gerous in a Commonwealth, I think 'tis advisable not to innovate in this Point, because such a change would give too much offence to the rest of your People, and too much Haughtiness to your own Nobility. 'Tis true, that when the Taxes are upon the Lands, so as to be unavoidable, it would be convenient to give the Nobility all the advantage of time for payment, and at last, if they are insolvent, it will not be amiss to neglect the rigorous Exaction of the Law, that so the Nobility be not ruin'd, because Extreame are always dangerous, and the Republick may suffer as much from having too many poor Noblemen, as from having too many rich ones; besides the Envy and Jealousie that must be in the hearts of those who shall find themselves naked, and their Equals clothed with their Garments, and that only for not having been able to pay an Imposition laid upon them
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by other Peoples Contrivance.

There are some, who not making a right Judgment of things, do inveigh extreamly against a Custom of this Republick, which is the having so many Offices and Places of so small Revenue, that those who enjoy them are almost necessitated to be corrupt; and so after they have been Judges and Governours, forc'd to come under the lash of the Law, or to justify their Integrity, if they can: This seems a notorious Abuse, and carries with it some appearance. But however, I should never advise to make these Employments better, because there results from this another greater advantage to the State, which is to keep the small Nobility under; for they may be compar'd to the Adder, which cannot exert its Poyson when 'tis numm'd with Cold: And if these Nobles, who are by inclination discontented, should once arrive but to a Mediocrity in For-

time, they would presently contest
 with the great ones, and by strength
 of their Numbers play some ill
 Trick to the Government : where-
 as now they are kept to their Duty,
 not only by Poverty, which clips
 the Wings of Ambition , but also
 by being subject to the Censure of
 the great ones, for having misbe-
 hav'd themselves in their Govern-
 ments. Indeed I could think it pru-
 dent to proceed against them some-
 thing coldly, unless they are guilty
 of very great Enormities, such as
 scandalize the generality of your
 Subjects ; for then 'tis necessary to
 shew a publick resentment : But
 otherwise I would have them hand-
 led gently, it being a kind of pu-
 nishment to lye open to a Prosecuti-
 on : And indeed I would never have
 any Nobleman, though never so
 guilty, be condemned to a Publick
 Infamous Death, because the Da-
 mage that results from thence upon
 the whole Order of the Nobility,
 when

when they are seen to pass through the Hands of an Hangman, is greater than the Good of a Publick Example can avail. Neither on the other side would I have these Noblemen, thus guilty, to walk the Streets, and be seen in publick, because then your Subjects would conceive a sinister Opinion of your Justice ; but they should be kept in Prison, or, if it be necessary, be privately dispatch'd.

If these Criminals fly from Justice, then you may use the utmost severity in your banishing of them ; because then it appears, that if nothing more be done, nothing more was feasible ; and let the same Rigour be observ'd in keeping them out : for since they are, as it were, gangreen'd Members cut off from the Body, it will not be expedient to unite them again to it with deformity of the whole.

Here I foresee I shall be censur'd by some, as a bad Pilot, who endeavouring

deavouring to shun *Scylla*, runs upon *Carybdis*; that is, while I aim at keeping the small Nobility under, I forget the danger may arise from the Great, and the Rich of that Order. I see the Objection, but do not value it; and my Reason is, the long Observation I have made of the Nature of this City, by the strength of which I dare boldly affirm, that the Republick of *Venice* will never come to its end by that which has ruin'd all other Republicks, to wit, when the power has been reduc'd first into a few hands, and then their Authority devolv'd upon one who has erected a *Monarchy*. The strange Emulation that reigns here among the great ones, even among those of the same Family; nay, that is between Brothers themselves, does secure the Government from this danger; and if by a Supposition, almost impossible, all the Brothers of one Family had the power given

ven them of making a Dictator, I am confident they would never agree to chuse one among themselves, but would rather chuse to be a part of the Government, divided among a Thousand Gentlemen, than to be Princes of the Blood, and Subjects.

The Great Governments, called *Governments of Expence*, and so contriv'd on purpose by our prudent Ancestors, to give an occasion to those who are too rich to lessen their Riches; ought to be dispos'd of according to the Intention of their first Institution: That is to say, not to those who have no means to sustain such a Burden, and must be forc'd by consequence to compass them *per fas & nefas*; and if they are Honest, must do it foolishly, because they are not wicked enough to do it knavishly, and so either acquire the Hatred of those they govern, or be laugh'd at, and contemned by them. This

is a Point of great Importance; and he who goes through such an Imployment meanly, and without Expence, demerits extremely of his Countrey, because he renders the Person that represents the State contemptible; and all Rebellions of Subjects have had their first Original Rise from the Contempt of the Prince

The Contests that happen between Nobleman and Nobleman of equal Fortunes, and are follow'd by Attempts upon one another, may be conniv'd at when they are reconcil'd; but if the thing be between a Nobleman of the Better sort, and one of the Lesser, let it be chastis'd with some appearance of Severity at least, for fear the Humours of the small Nobility should be stirr'd; But if one of these shall attack a Nobleman of the First Rate, let him be punish'd with a heavy hand, lest the Party injur'd, being potent in Friends, go
about

about to do himself Justice, to the great detriment of the Publick Authority : But if a Nobleman do commit an Enormity towards a Subject, first let there be all the endeavour possible used to justifie him; and if that cannot be, let the punishment be with more Noise than Harm; But if a Subject insults a Nobleman, let the Revenge be sharp and publick, that the Subjects may not accustom themselves to lay hands upon the Nobility, but rather think them Venerable and Sacred.

In Civil Judicatures it would be requisite to act without Passion, to take away that ill Opinion that Men have of the Partiality of Justice, in favour of the Great. This Belief must be destroyed; for a Subject that once thinks himself prejudg'd by the Quality of his Adversary, will never be capable of seeing whether his Cause has been decided according to the me-
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rit of it or no: Therefore there can never be too much diligence used in the Administration of Civil Judicatures, which are one of the greatest Foundations of Government; for when a Subject can say to himself, That he shall have Justice, if his Case deserves it, he submits to a great many other Grievances without repining: And on the contrary, though after an unjust Sentence, he should be indulg'd in some Criminal Matter, he will never have a Love for the Government, because the Injury receiv'd, will stick in his Memory, and the Indulgence will vanish out of it.

The Quarrels between the *Plebeians* may be judged according to the common course of Justice, which may there appear in its Natural Being, there arising no Politick Grounds to disturb the Course of it; nay, rather their little Animosities are to be fomented;

as *Cato* us'd to do in his Family ; and for this Reason, wise Antiquity permitted the Encounters and Battles that are still practis'd in this City, between several Parties of the People ; But all Assemblies of numerous Bodies are to be avoided as the Plague, because nothing can sooner overturn the *Commonwealth*, than the Facility the People may meet with in getting together to confer or debate about their Grievances ; Nay, this thing is so dangerous, that it is to be detested and abhorr'd, even in the *Nobility*, because that there being in all Bodies some ill Humours, if they are not united, either they do not work at all, or do not work ill ; But if they once are in a Mass, and take their course one way, they not only are hard to cure, but often prove mortal to the Body. Let there be a careful watch upon all Seditious Discourses, nay, upon all Speculative ones that seem any way
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to censure the Government ; and set before your Eyes the Example of Heresies, which have never so much wasted the Church as when they have had their Beginnings from Curiosity and Jest.

Let the City *Arsenal* be kept up, though there be not present occasion for it, because things that depend upon Time, must be anticipated by time. Let the Masters and Tradesmen of the place be kept satisfied, and upon any Fault committed, let the Punishment be Paternal ; that is, with seeming Rigour, but not such as to make them run away ; for, if possible, they are to believe the Fable of the Mouse, who thought its hole to be all the World.

Let the Publick Secretaries, and all other Officers that must be inform'd of the Publick Concerns, be chosen with care, as like to be faithful and diligent ; but when once admitted, though they should prove
other-

otherwise, let them be born withal, because there is need of but a few to do well : But every single Officer can do hurt ; and it's much easier to defend ones self from a Potent Foreign Enemy , than from an ill-meaning Servant.

Let the Manufactures which are peculiar to *Venice*, be preserv'd; and to that end let them not be loaded with many Impositions , because that Profit and Gain which has made Men venture through a Thousand Difficulties , to discover New Worlds , will still carry the Merchant, if he cannot have it at home, to seek it abroad , though he go to the *Antipodes* for it. Preserve the Artists therefore , remembering that most Arts are a kind of Phantastick Being.

The Marriages between Noblemen and Women of the City, may be tolerated, if the Women are very rich ; because it often happens that the Industry of many Years

of the *Plebeians*, serves only to enrich the House of a Nobleman; and it is a gentle Imperceptible sort of Usurpation; 'tis true, 'tis something abating of the Lustre of the Noble Families; but that is only in abstract and in general, but in reality it advantages the Nobility; and there need be no fear that the Children be degenerate and base, because nothing so debases a Nobleman as Poverty: Besides, there results from this another great advantage, which is, to make the *Plebeians* concern'd by Affection for the Nobility, and bound to study their advantage by a much sweeter tye than that of Obedience.

Let the Considerable Honours of the Commonwealth be disposed of to those who may naturally pretend to them, for having gone through the many Employments, which are steps to the highest Dignities, making always an allowance for extraordinary Merit, in which
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the State can never be too prodigal : For otherwise to prefer those who cannot reckon themselves among the Lawful Pretenders, gives just Offence to the others his Equals, and likewise strengthens the pretensions of the unworthy, who not seeing any thing in that Fortunate Man that exceeds their ordinary Talent, cannot imagine why he should be preferr'd, and they excluded from the like Dignities. The Subject on the other hand is hardly brought to pay Excessive Reverence where they never us'd to give but ordinary Respect ; and from this argues, That the Dignity it self is not of so much value, since it is bestowed upon so inconsiderable a Person.

And because it is in the Nature of all sublunary things to have a mixture of Imperfection, I must own, that the Republick of *Venice* has likewise its Defects; and the Chief one is, That the Body of the

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Nobility is too numerous to be *Aristocratical* ; therefore it will always be expedient to contrive, by all Arts imaginable , that the Great Council do delegate the greatest Authority that may be to the Senate and the Council of *Ten* : But this must be done by secret imperceptible ways, such as shall not be discover'd till after 'tis done, because when they have once for all parted with their power, it will be a happy settlement of the deliberating part, and if the same can be composed in the Judiciary and distributive Power, it may be hop'd, that the Constitution of the State will be more vigorous: It cannot be denied but the Great Council does relish very much of the *Mobile* , and by consequent, subject to impetuous Deliberations, not always weigh'd in the Ballance of Prudence and Experience. And truly I admire, that wise Antiquity did not gain this Point, it being
easie

easie for them to take advantage of the simplicity of their times ; or at least to have prolong'd the time of the great Magistratures further than from Year to Year, at the end of which they now must have a new Confirmation from the Senate ; For this being design'd to prevent the falling into the Tyranny of the great ones, does unawares run the State into that of the meaner sort, so much the more odious by how much 'tis more numerous and unexperienc'd ; We should see more vigorous Resolutions in the Senators, if they were not continually obliged to court the Favour of the *Piazza*.

The Office of *Avogadore* is to be disposed of with extream Circumspection, and that to Persons of Eminency, such as have no need of fawning upon the Multitude of the Great Council, and then the Senate and Council of *Ten* might make some steps beyond their Natural
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Authority, which would be born with patience, and Time would give them Prescription: Whereas, if an *Avvadore*, to make himself Popular, shall carry these Deliberations to the Great Councils Censure, immediately out of Jealousie they are annull'd, though never so expedient. Therefore if that Office of *Avvadore* cannot be placed in the hands of one who inclines more to the *Patritian* than to the *Popular* side, it would be well to give it to one of mean Spirit, and a quiet Temper; or if it be disposed of to an unquiet bold man, let him be one who lies under some infamous imputation of Corruption, or other Enormity, to the end that the first may not be able, nor the latter dare to affront, and try it with the *Grande*es of the State; Otherwise an *Avvadore* of Parts, Integrity and Malignity, may easily set fire to the Four Corners of the Commonwealth.

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For the same Reasons it will always be well to lessen the Authority of the *Quaranties*, they being naturally popular. They were constituted numerous, to prevent the Venality of Justice; but on the other hand they are subject to gather peccant Humours, and afford too much nourishment to a Feverish Temper: They may be born with in the administration of Civil Justice, but in Criminals their power should be lessen'd, which may be done by the Council of *Ten's* taking to their Cognizance all Criminal Cases that they can any ways draw to them, and by leaving off the Custom of deligating the Power of the Senate and *Signoria* to these *Quaranties*, as is now practis'd but too often. If these *Quaranties* were quite taken away, it would be better for the Government, but then it would be as necessary to provide some other way for so many necessitous and idle persons.

It

It were well to use all means to take from them the Authority of judging Noblemen in Criminal Cases; for so by degrees they will lose many of the Priviledges affected to the Nobility, as also I could wish they were totally excluded from the Senate; But that is more to be wish'd than hop'd for.

As for the People, let them always be provided for by plenty of things for sustenance, and as cheap as may be: For the Nature of the Rabble is so malicious, that even when scarcity of Provisions comes from the failing of the Crops, they nevertheless impute it to the Malice or Negligence of the Great ones: So there is no way to make them hold their peace, but to stop their Mouths. Employ as many of the People as may be in the Service of the Publick, that so drawing their Livelyhood from the Government, they may have affection for it, and the Numbers of the Necessitous will

will thereby be lessen'd: for if Hunger and Want can make strong Towns yield, it will likewise incite Men to venture their Lives in desperate Attempts, rather than linger in misery. Yet still I would not advise to take any into Office that had not first gain'd wherewithal to subsist in a mediocrity; for else it will be but giving him a kind of leave to cheat, to the great damage of the Publick.

As for the Married Women of the City, let there be care taken to keep them honest; and to have them so, they must be kept retir'd, remembring, that the Beginnings of all Corruption in that kind are slight, and proceed from a Look or a Salute.

Let one Modern Abuse be reform'd, which is, that the Noblemen do take upon them to force the People to make Agreements, Payments, or Marriages, and not dare to have recourse to the Publick
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Authority, upon which this is an Usurpation: If this be not remedied, 'tis enough to cause another *Sicilian Vespers*: Besides, that it is likely to set all the Nobility together by the Ears, while each will maintain his own Friends and Dependents.

In all Occurrences where the Publick Faith is engaged, let it be inviolably kept, without minding any present advantage that might accrew by the breaking of it; for that is but momentaneous: whereas the Benefit of keeping Faith is eternal; and a Prince that breaks his Word, must invent a new Religion to make himself be believed another time, seeing the Oaths he made in the Religion he professes have not been able to bind him.

Let the Nobles forbear all Trading; for a State that will have Merchants, must not have their Governours exercise that Profession,

on, because the Merchants will always be afraid of being Brow-beaten in Bargains, and over-aw'd in their Dealings. The *Spaniards*, who have so little kindness for the *Venetian* Government, have not a more odious Name than to call it, *A Republick of Merchants*. By an Ancient Law, a Nobleman tax'd with Trading, cannot enter into a Turnament, as not being fit Company for *Cavaliers*. Merchandise may in a short time either extreamly enrich, or totally ruine a Family, both which are dangerous for the Commonwealth. Besides, a Merchant is of a necessity in some measure a Foreigner, while his Trade and Interest lies abroad, and a Nobleman ought to have no Interest nor Affection but at home. If Politicians have taught, that it is not safe for a great City to have too sumptuous Palaces and Villas in its Territory, lest the fear of losing of them should incline them to

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yield

yield the very City to a potent Enemy : What shall we say of those Nobles , who, being engag'd in Trade, may have many Thousands of Crowns in an Enemies Country ? In the beginnings of a Commonwealth, Merchandising was necessary to get out of Poverty, and now 'tis dangerous, as being the Fomenter of too much Luxury. The *Genoueses* who have continued the Trading of their Nobility, have but small Respect shew'd them by other Princes , and are more valued one by one than altogether.

Let superfluous Pomps be forbidden, though if they were only followed by the Rich, it would be of use to the Government, because it would bleed those who are too sanguine ; but by reason of the Emulation which is between those of the same Degree, the permitting of them would prove ruinous to many Families, who could neither avoid

void them , nor go through with them : And whoever by a Punctilio of Honour is brought to the necessity of doing more than he is able, must use, to compass it, such means as he ought not to employ.

Before a Law be made and promulgated, let it be well thought on and debated: but being once made, let it be observed, and the *non*-observance of it punished ; because whoever suffers Disobedience in small matters, teaches it in greater : And that Nobleman who thinks to distinguish himself by slighting of the Laws , offends both his Country and himself by such an Example, more than by any dissoluteness he could be guilty of, because he directly strikes at the Public Authority ; and besides, such a Custom once taking Root in a Commonwealth, and being an inveterate Abuse among the Nobility, it is not to be reform'd with less than the loss of the Lives of half the Body.

If there be an occasion of coming to some Resolution that may be thought displeasing to the generality, particularly in point of Justice, let it be given out, That it was carried by a thin Majority, that at least they who were against it, may please themselves in thinking they had many of their Opinion.

Let the Secrets of the Government be kept inviolably, and do not forget that Ancient Record of the *Venetian Circumspection*, which was, That when the general *Carmagnuola* was condemned, the Resolution (though taken by Three Hundred and Fifteen Senators) never took Air for Eight Months together before the Execution; which is a thing that the most absolute Princes could not have met with in the Fidelity of Three or Four State-Ministers, though bound by excessive Rewards to Secrecy. And what a wonderful thing was the deposition
of

of the *Doge Foscari*, conceal'd by his own Brother ? Certainly one cannot without Tears observe, that in our Times so great a Quality which seem'd to be proper to the *Venetian Commonwealth*, is something altered by the inconsideration of the young Nobility, who, not out of Disloyalty, but too much Freedom, do let things slip from them which ought to be conceal'd. I think every *Venetian* Nobleman ought to teach his Children the use of Secresie with their Catechism ; but the better way were to forbid all talking of Publick Concerns out of the place where they are properly to be deliberated on, and much less among those who are partakers of the Secret.

Let the Honours and Dignities of the Commonwealth be dispensed regularly, and by degrees, avoiding all sudden Flights, because they are dangerous : To see a Cloud enlighten'd of a sudden, is most com-

monly a sign of a Thunderbolt to come out of it; and he that from a private man leaps in an instant to the Port of a Prince, has something of the Player. Honours given by degrees keep the young Nobility from attaining them before they are ripe for them; and we may observe, that as in Physick a man moderately Learned, but well Experienc'd, is safer for the health of the Body Natural; So in the Government of the Commonwealth, a man often employed, though, perhaps of less acuteness, succeeds best. All Matters of Benefices are very properly under the Cognizance of the Great Council, but it would be as proper to take away all Appeals to the *Quaranties*, and place them in the Senate, because it often happens, that these Causes are to be decided according to reason of State; and those *Quarantia Judges* put little value upon those Politick Reasons: And besides, it seems

seems a great incongruity, that a Sentence, where the Person of the *Doge*, and the whole *Signoria*, both intervene, should afterwards be lyable to the Censure of Forty Persons of lesser value. I believe if it were observed to chastise rigorously, but secretly all those Lawyers and their Clients, who carry these Appeals to the *Quarantias*, the use of them would be less frequent, and in time they would be forborn, as if they were forbidden.

If it should fall out, that any of your Subjects should procure a Decree in the *Rota*, or Court of *Rome*, you must rigorously command from him a Renunciation *ab Impetratis*, else all beneficiary Causes will be devolv'd to *Rome*, where they are look'd upon as Sacred, and so a fourth part of all Civil Causes would be lost for your own Courts: Auditors of the *Rota* are to be with the Commonwealth, like Bishops *in partibus Infidelium*, a thing of

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Title,

Title, but without Subjects.

Let the Bishops of the *Venetian* State be always præcogniz'd in the Consistory by a *Venetian Cardinal*, without the Circumstance of creating him Special Procurator; but as Protector, which he really ought to be as other *Cardinals* brag they are so; for other States. For the Court of *Rome*, to avoid these procurations to *Venetian Cardinals*, would perhaps desist making any of that Nation, that so they might oblige the State to have recourse to Strangers, which in time would also prejudice the pretence of being treated as *Crown'd Heads*. If the preconisation be made otherwise, let the State seize the Temporalities of the Bishoprick, and stop all Pensions laid upon it: 'Tis true, that if the Cardinal *Nipote* should make the Preconisation, and enjoy at the same time the priviledge of a *Venetian Nobleman*, it could not well be rejected.

If

If it should ever happen that there should be a *Pope*, I won't say a *Venetian*, for that would be of more danger than advantage to the Government, but a Foreigner well inclin'd to the *Venetian* Republick, then would be the time to obtain once for all the Grant of the *Tenths* upon the Clergy, as once it was got under *Clement* the Sixth, whose Bull is unfortunately lost; for 'tis troublesome to get it renew'd every Five Year or Seven Year; and it would be a Point gain'd which still would more and more equal the Republick with Crown'd Heads; as also if in the Titles given by the *Pope* to the *Doge*, there could be gain'd the Superlative, as *Carissimo* or *Dilectissimo*, as is usual to Crown'd Heads, it would be a new lustre to the Republick, which for want of these things, and also because that never any *Venetian Nuncio* was promoted to be Cardinal, is look'd upon at

Rome as a kind of Third Power between Crown'd Heads and the Ducal State. If, I say, all this could be gain'd by the State from a *Pope*, there might be some return made, by making a Law, That Churchmen in Criminals should not be judged by any Tribunal but the Council of *Ten*, or Delegates from that Council. And now I am speaking of that Council, I cannot but inculcate, That all means possible should be used to hinder an *Avogadore* from daring to carry the Decrees of the Council of *Ten* to be re-view'd or censur'd by any other Council: but rather, if there ought to be any Change made in them, let it be by the same Power that made them; otherwise the Consequence will be a constant annihilation of their Decrees, and a manifest depression of the great Nobility, with an Exaltation of the lesser.

Touching the Authority of this Council, I have this more to say,
That

That I could wish, that the Delegations of its Power were less frequent, with great regard to the Dignity of the Persons, as well as to the Splendor of the Government, which is always more revered when it is least communicated, like the Sun-beams, which in that glorious Body are of Gold, but communicated to the Moon, are but of Silver. Indeed our Ancestors would have deserved well of us, if they had lengthened the time of this Magistracy: but because that which was not done in those Old Times, can hardly be hop'd for in these Modern ones, the only Remedy would be to obtain a Continuation of the same persons for another year, under pretext of avoiding so many various Elections in so short a time as must be made by a Scrutiny in the *Pregadi*: 'Tis true, that would exempt the persons continued from the Governments of Expence; but as long as that Exemption

tion did not extend beyond a year, there would be little Inconvenience in it : And if it be objected, That this would too much strengthen the Authority of the great ones, I answer, That it lasting but a few months, could not be of ill Consequence : and on the other side, those hands are, as it were, tied up, which ought to be at liberty to do Justice, while every week they may be canvass'd and teas'd by a Party of mean Persons, both for the Conditions of their Mind and Fortune : I have often admired how the Council of *Ten* (having already all the Criminal Power, and a good part of the Judiciary in Civil Causes, as well as in State-Affairs) have suffered themselves to be thus fetter'd, it seeming to me almost impossible that the Inferiour sort should at the time of this Modification have so far prevail'd over the middling Nobility, as to make them forget, that it is much better

better obeying a few Great Ones, than a Multitude of Inferiours. The Prudence of the Great Ones must be awak'd, to take all secret advantage to repair these past Omifions by means not easily penetrated.

Let Vertue be esteem'd wherever it is; and if it be Eminent in one who is not Noble, let it find a Regard; for he has made himself Noble; and all Hereditary Nobility has had its beginning from some personal Eminency. And thus much for the First Head.

The Second Head, which is concerning the Government of your Subjects, may be divided into those who confine upon the Sea, and in your Islands, and those of *Terra Firma*.

As to the first, there needs not much Speculation; for they confining only upon the *Turk*, and there
be.

being among them but few Persons of Note or Riches, there remains nothing but to shew your selves just by giving them good Rulers; and there you ought to be very careful: for if they have Justice and Plenty, they will never think of changing their Masters: Those few of *Istria* and *Dalmatia*, that confine upon the Emperour, have not in themselves any Qualities to waken your Jealousie, and are besides well affectioned to the Government of the Republick.

For your *Greek* Subjects of the Island of *Candia*, and the other Islands of the *Levant*, there is no doubt but there is some greater regard to be had of them, first, because that the *Greek* Faith is never to be trusted; and perhaps they would not much stick at submitting to the *Turk*, having the Example of all the rest of their Nation before their Eyes: These therefore must be watch'd with more attention,

on, lest, like Wild Beasts, as they are, they should find an occasion to use their Teeth and Claws; the surest way is to keep good Garrisons to awe them, and not use them to Arms or Musters, in hopes of being assisted by them in an Extremity : for they will always shew ill Inclinations proportionably to the Strength they shall be Masters of, they being of the Nature of the Gally-Slaves, who, if they were well us'd, would return the kindness, by seizing the Gally, and carry it and its Commander to *Algiers* : Wine and Bastonadoes ought to be their Share, and keep Good Nature for a better occasion.

As for the Gentlemen of those Collonies, you must be very watchful of them; for besides the Natural Ferocity of the Climate, they have the Character of *Noblemen*, which raises their Spirits, as the frequent Rebellions of *Candia* do

do sufficiently evidence. The use of Colonies was advantageous to the *Roman Commonwealth*, because they preserv'd even in *Asia* and *Africa*, *Roman Inclinations*, and with them a kindness for their Country. If the Gentlemen of these Colonies do tyrannize over the Villages of their Dominion, the best way is not to seem to see it, that there may be no kindness between them and their Subjects ; but if they offend in any thing else, 'twill be well to chastise them severely, that they may not brag of any Priviledges more than others : It will not be amiss likewise to dispute all their Pretensions to any particular Jurisdiction ; and if at any time their Nobility or Title be disputed, it will do well to sell them the Confirmation of it at as dear a Rate as possible : and, in a word, remember that all the Good that can come from them, is already obtain'd, which was to fix the *Venerian*

netian Dominion; and for the future there is nothing but Mischief to be expected from them.

As for the Subjects of *Terra Firma*, there is required a more abstruse way of governing, by distinguishing those who by an ancient Inclination are well affected to the Republick, as those of *Brescia*, *Crema*, and *Bergamo*, and also those of *Vicenza*; for to them there ought to be suitable returns of kindness made upon occasion to the others, who only have a kindness of Obedience, such as are the *Veroneses*, *Padouans* and *Trevigians*, it will be good to make shew of great Justice towards them, but not let slip any occasion of keeping them low: It is good to wink at the Fewds and Enmities that happen among them, for from these two benefits arise to the Commonwealth, to wit, Private Discord among themselves, and good Confiscations to the Publick.

Let

Let all Extortions and Oppressions committed by the Gentry upon the People, be severely punished, that the People may be affectionate to the Government, as being particularly protected by it : In all occasions of Taxes and Impositions, suffer not any Remonstrances, remembering how in 1606. there had like to have been a League between the *Brescian* and *Veronese*, in order to obtain an Abolition of Imposts, and with what boldness the *Brescians* Embassadors made their Complaints in the Senate: It was a very previous Disposition to a Rebellion ; Therefore it will be fit to let them know, That if the State think good to lay a Tax, there is no way of avoiding it. Those who in the Councils of these Towns, are of a resolute Nature, and somewhat refractory to the Orders of the State, you must either ruin or oblige, even at the Publick Charge : For a small Leven is enough

nough to ferment a great Mass of Bread.

The *Brescians* have a Priviledge which you must infringe upon all fit opportunities, which is, *That no Estates of Brescians can be bought but by Brescians themselves* : For if the *Venetians* could extend themselves in that most fertile Country, in a few years it would be as it is now with the *Padouans*, who have scarce a Third of their own Country left them. In the Case of a Rich Heiress, it will be well to endeavour, by all fair means, to marry her with some of the *Venetian* Nobility, to enrich them, and impoverish the others. Let their Governours be chosen among those of the highest Spirits of the *Venetian* Nobility, that they may in them venerate the Prince : for every man naturally gives more Credit to his Eyes than to his Ears. Observe however this Caution in Taxing, That you do not thereby

thereby hinder Plenty : For though men may be perswaded to part with Superfluities, yet not with what is necessary for Life. As for Employments, if there be room, omit not to give them to the Natives, but still in places remote from their own Dwelling, and keep them there as long as may be, that they may lose their Interest at home. If there be Heads of Factions among them, they must be Exterminated any way ; but if you have them in Prison, 'tis better to use Poyson than the Hangman, because the advantage will be the same, and the *odium* less. You must have an Account of the Taxes that their Neighbours the *Milaneses* undergo, and still let those of the *Venetian* Subjects be something lighter in comparison ; and moreover let them be free from quartering of Souldiers, which is in it self the heaviest of all Tyrannical Oppressions.

Let

Let the great Crimes be still brought before the Council of *Ten*, that the Veneration for the Power at distance may be greater, and likewise because the Ministers of Justice will be less subject to be corrupted, when the Criminals are in the Prisons of the State. Let the Process against them be tedious, that so the *slowness* of proceedings may be some part of punishment: But for the *Banditi*, if they dare to appear in the State, let them be Exterminated with all Industry; for there cannot be a greater Demonstration of Contempt in the Subject, and Weakness of the Prince, than for a Condemned Man to dare to come into the Dominions out of which he has been banished, as if one should frequent another man's House in spite of his Teeth. The Bishopricks and other Church-Preferments may be conferr'd upon the Natives, first, to avoid the Imputation

putation of too much *Avarice* in the *Venetian* Nobility, if they should take all Preferments to themselves. *Secondly*, In order to debase the Spirits of the Natives, and turn them off from Arms to an idle Life: Besides, it will be a kind of a Shadow of Liberty, to make them bear their Subjection the better. But as much as it may be convenient to let them attain the Degree of Bishops, so much would it be dangerous to let them arrive to that of Cardinal; for then they will be sure to abhor the Quality of Subjects, since those who wear that Purple have usurp'd the Precedency even over Princes.

Let every City have the making of their own Gentry by their Common-Council; for that will make it so much the meaner; but still let them be bound to have the Confirmation from the Senate.

Let

Let all those Families who apply themselves to the Service of Foreign Princes, be upon all occasions slighted, and not at all countenanced by the Government, intimating to them by that silent notice, That he deserves little of his own Prince who seeks Employment with a Foreign one : And if any of these who have serv'd abroad, should be so bold, as to contend with a *Venetian* Nobleman, if it be at *Venice*, let the Punishment be severe, if he be in the wrong ; but if it is in his own Country, let it be gentle, that the Opinion of the Publick Justice may be advantageously insinuated to the People ; and likewise, that the Noble *Venetians* themselves may avoid Contests, where they are not more immediately protected.

Let the Citadels of the Chief Cities be well provided, as much against a Foreign Enemy, as to chastise a Rebellion at home, nothing

thing so much inclining to offend, as the hopes of Impunity : and it may indeed be said, That if Men were certain of a punishment to follow, they would never offend at all ; but a Prince that is sufficiently provided, is sufficiently safe. Remember, that as it is very hard to find either a Wife or a Monk, that one time or another have not repented the loss of their Natural Liberty, so the same may be said of Subjects, who fancy that they have parted with more of that they were born to than was necessary for their well-being. And let this suffice for the Second Head.

Coming now to those several Princes with whom the *Venetian* Republick may have Concerns, we will begin with the *Pope*, as being the first in Dignity, if not in Power.

And

And here we must have a Two-fold Consideration, he being to be look'd upon as a Spiritual and as a Temporal Prince. There has been some Advertisements given already about his Spiritual Power : We will add here what was then omitted :

First, We must admire the wonderful State of that Monarchy, which from a mean and persecuted Condition, for the *Series* of many years, in which the very Exercise of Religion was punished with Death, is arriv'd to so much Greatness, that all Regal Dignities of the same Communion, pay Homage to this Spiritual Monarch, by the kissing of his Feet. God Almighty has been pleas'd this way to shew the Reward of Christian Religion, by raising to the Supreme Greatness the Institutors and Ministers of it ; but the Piety of Christian Princes has very much

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tributed to it ; and the first was *Constantine*: This Emperor not only embrac'd the Christian Faith, but enrich'd the Church extreamly, and since his time several other Emperors and Kings have, as it were, vied with one another, who should give most: But that which is most inscrutable is, how with their Riches they came to give away also their Jurisdiction and Power.

For six hundred years after the coming of Christ the Popes were always confirmed by the Emperors, or in their steads, by the *Exarcks* of *Ravenna*; and in the very Patent of Confirmation there was always written these Words, *Regnante Tali Domino Nostro*. In the year 518. the Emperor *Justinus* sent from *Constantinople* his Embassadors to Pope *Hormisdas*, to confirm the Authority of the Apostolical See, and to announce Peace to the Church. In 684. *Constantine* the
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Second gave to *Benedictus* the Second a Concession, by which, for the future, the Election of Popes should be made by the Clergy and People of *Rome*, and should not need the Confirmation of the Emperour, nor of the *Exarck*, not reflecting, that the holiness of those times might come to change it self into an Interest of State. *Bonifacius* the Third obtained of the Emperour *Phocas*, that all other Christian Churches might be obedient to the *Roman*. After this, in the year 708. *Justinus* the Second was the first that submitted to kiss the Pope's Feet; and that Pope's Name was *Constantine*: But *Adrian* the first having received great Favours from *Charles* the first, King of *France*, did in a Council of One Hundred and Fifty Three Bishops, confer upon him the Authority of chusing the Popes, which was about the year 773. a Priviledge which his Son *Lewis the Pious* knew not

how to keep, but parted with it for the imaginary Title of *Ticus*; to which might be added that of *Simple*. Howsoever scandalous the Emperours were in their Lives, the Popes did use to bear with them, referring to God Almighty the punishment of them: But in the year 713. *Philip*, Emperour of *Constantinople*, being fallen into Heresy, was Excommunicated by Pope *Constantine*, and had the Reward due for all the Honours and Priviledges given by his Predecessors to the Popes. This was the very first time that the Imperial Power was forc'd to sloop to the Papal; and yet at the same time the Church of *Milan* claim'd an Independency from the *Roman*, and maintain'd it for above Two Hundred Years, being countenanc'd by the Emperours, who often came into *Italy*, and in their absence hy the *Exarcks* of *Ravenna*, till at last in the year 1057. it yielded up the Contest to Pope *Stephen*
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the Ninth. In the year 1143. *Celestin* the Second was the first Pope chosen by Cardinals in Exclusion to the People.

I have made this Narration, that it may appear by what Degrees this Spiritual Monarchy has increased ; and in it, the Goodness of Christian Princes is not more to be admired than the Dexterity of the Popes, in not omitting any occasion to gain ground.

At present the Emperour is chosen by a Pontifical Bull, where the Power of Election is committed to the Three Ecclesiastical, and Four Secular Electors, with an Obligation nevertheless in the Emperour chosen, to receive his Confirmation and Coronation from the Pope ; so that the Subject is at last become Prince over his own Prince, not without some reflection of Weakness upon *Otho* the Fourth, Emperour of *Germany*, who in the year 994. agreed with Pope *Gregory* to

settle the Election in this manner, for the Honour (as he thought) of the *German* Nation, but with great Diminution of the Imperial Dignity. To this Grandeur of the Papacy, if we add that of having subjected to its power all the other Bishops of *Christendom*, and obtain'd to be own'd the first of all the Patriarchs, who long contested its Primacy. I say, so high a Power ought to make all other well-govern'd States very wary in their proceedings with it, and to have a careful Eye upon all those occasions wherein the pontifical Authority may be still enlarged, because 'tis observed, that all Courtesies and Favours of Princes are in that Court turn'd to Debts and Claims in the space of a few years; and to obtain the possession, they do not spare for *Exorcisms* and *Anathemas*.

There is one Custom, or rather Abuse introduc'd in that Court, which

which deserves great consideration from Princes, which is the power the *Pope* has assum'd of deposing Princes and Sovereigns, and giving their Kingdoms and States to others, under pretext of ill Government. The Prodigal Son in the Gospel did not lose his Right to his portion, though he was resolv'd to dissipate and consume it viciously, because that Title which we receive from Nature can never be lost in our whole Life. The Kings of *Navar* were fain to go *Vagabonds* about the World for the sake of a Bit of Parchment which *Pope Julius* the Second put out against them, whereby King *John* the Second lost his Kingdom, which was given to *Ferdinand* of *Arragon*; and had not providence brought them to the Crown of *France*, there would have been no mention in the World of the Kings of *Navar*.

From this Liberty of taking away Kingdoms, the *Popes* assume that of Erecting them. Pope *Paul* the Fourth made *Ireland* a Kingdom, and *Pius* the Fifth Erected *Tuscany* into a great Dutchy. Queen *Elizabeth* of *England*, was deposed by *Paul* the Third, and according to the usual custom, her Kingdom given to *Philip* the Second of *Spain*, who was to execute the Papal Sentence; but he met with the Winds and Seas, and the *English* Ships, which quite defeated his *Armada*. In *France*, by a priviledge of the *Gallican* Church, they admit of no Bulls that contain Deprivation of Kings, but keep to the Right of Succession: and indeed to depose an actual King, and give away his Kingdom, is not only to destroy a suppos'd Delinquent, but to punish an Innocent Successour, and likewise to prejudice the Right of Election in those who have it.

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On the other hand *England* has often thought fit to make it self Tributary to the See of *Rome* by the *Peter-Pence*, the first time under Pope *Leo* the Fourth, and more remarkably under *King John*, in 1214. to avoid the Invasion from *France*; but *Henry* the Eighth delivered himself once for all, and not only refused the Tribute, but made himself amends by seizing the Church-Lands. The fresh Example of *Paul* the Fifth towards this Republick is never to be forgot, who charitably would have govern'd another bodies House, under pretext that the Master did not understand how to do it himself: And the constancy of the *Venetian* Republick will have given fair warning to the Court of *Rome*, how they undertake such Quarrels, since they were forced to come to an agreement with very little satisfaction or Honour on their side, having been obliged ta-

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citely to give up their claim ; for to demand peremptorily , and then relinquish the Demand, is a sign it was not well founded in Justice ; and the Absolution refus'd , was proof enough, that the Excommunication was void in it self : So that the advantage that has accrew'd to the *Venetian* Government from the Contest, has been much greater than the damage sustain'd in it.

If ever for the future, which I scarce believe, there should happen an occasion of an Interdict from the Court of *Rome* to the Republick , I should advise presently to post up in *Rome* an Appellation to the future Council, which is a cruel blow to them : For first, it insinuates the Superiority of the Council over the *Pope* ; and secondly, it revives the memory of Councils, and lets them see they are not things quite forgot all the World over. If there be
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care taken to examine well all Bulls that come from *Rome*, and the Observation of what has been hitherto practis'd, be strictly continued, it may be hop'd, that the Republick shall not undergo any greater Subjection than other Princes, but rather shall have some Liberty above them, particularly more than the *Spaniards*, who find their account in complying with the Tyranny of *Rome*, because they receive at the same time great Favours from it, and are proud of maintaining its Authority. To say truth, the *Popes* hitherto have shew'd little kindness to the Republick, and except the Priviledges granted by *Alexander the Third*, which serve more to register to the World the Action of the Republick, in restoring and protecting him, than for any thing else: For the *Doge* might of himself without the Papal Concession, have assum'd those other little Ornaments

naments of the *Ombrella*, the Standard and the Sword: So that bating the Concessions of the *Decimes* upon the Clergy, and the Nominations to the Bishopricks, this Country of ours feels but slender Effects of the Pontifical Kindness, which may be an advantage upon all Occurrences of Interest of State to stick the closer to that, because there needs no Complements where every one desires but his own.

In considering the Secular Power of the *Pope*, we will do it upon Five Heads, which may serve to examine all other Princes Interests with the Republick.

First, *If it be advantageous to the Republick to have the Church grow greater.*

Secondly, *What Title, Inclination or Facility the Popes may have to acquire any part of the State of the Republick.*

Thirdly,

Thirdly, *What Inclination, Title or Facility the Republick may have to acquire any part of the State of the Church.*

Fourthly, *If the Church may unite with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Princes.*

Fifthly, *If the Church can unite with other Princes, to hinder the progress of the Arme of the Republick.*

To begin with the First, we will answer with a General Rule, which is, That it never is advantageous to a Prince, who desires to remain free and powerful, to let another grow great, except it be to lessen a Third, who is greater than them both; and if he that is thus agrandiz'd be a Neighbour, his advancement is so much more to be feared: These Alterations indeed may not be so dangerous to a little Prince, who does not fear depending upon a great one, to a
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void being molested by one who is already too strong for him.

But to come closer to the Case of the Republick, we will say, That if the Church could make it self Master of any part of the King of *Spain's* Dominions in *Italy*, where he is the greatest Prince, they might hope for the consent of the Republick, which is the Second Great *Italian* Potentate, because by that means the Republick might become the First; and however, the strength of the Church will always give less jealousy to the Republick, than the *Spanish* Power in *Italy*; for the Nature of the Pontifical Principality is Elective and Temporary, and the Aims and Designs of that Court vary according to the *Genius* of the several *Popes*; and sometimes it is subject to long Vacancies: whereas the Monarchy of *Spain* is successive, and, as one may say, Eternal, and govern'd by standing lasting Maxims.

But

But if the Church be to grow great by the Spoils of any other *Italian* Prince, it would be the Interest of the Republick to oppose it, because the Damage thence resulting is evident, and the Advantage dangerous. It ought to be well consider'd, how the State of the Church is increased in this last Century. The custom that was in the Church before, to give *Infeodations* upon slight Acknowledgments, had brought that power to be more of show than real strength; but *Julius* the Second, succeeding *Alexander* the Sixth, made *Borgia*, Duke of *Valentine*, Nephew to *Alexander*, who had seiz'd upon all those *Infeodations* in *Romania*, re-fund them to the Church, and added to them the conquest of *Bologna*, and got also from the Republick the Cities of *Cervia*, *Rimini*, *Ravenna*, *Faenza*, *Imola*, and others, to which, under *Clement* the Eighth, was added the whole Dutchy of
Ferrara,

Ferrara, and lately that of *Urbino*: So that these Acquisitions alone would make up a great *Principality*: and the Church seems to want nothing towards the making of it the most considerable power of *Italy*, than the addition of *Parma* and *Piacenza*, and some little Independent Castles in the Territories about *Rome*: Besides, it can never more be lessen'd by *Infeodations*, that being quite left off by that Court: So that to let the Church grow any greater in *Italy*, generally speaking, cannot be for the Interest of the *Venetian Republick*.

To the Second Point, *What Title, Inclination or Facility the Church may have to acquire any portion of the State of the Republick*, we shall say, That since the Court makes profession of the Extremest Justice, and that likewise they are loth to begin the Example of Princes usurping upon one another,

ther, I think they can hardly set up any Title but upon the *Pole-sine* of *Rovigo*, which they say was formerly annex'd to the Dutchy of *Ferrara*; and in the times that the Dispute was between the Dukes of *Ferrara* and the Republick, the *Popes* always shewed themselves smart Defenders of the Dukes: Of Four Interdicts published by the Church against the *Venetians*, Two of them were for this very cause, the first in the year 1305. the Second in the year 1483. under *Sixtus* the Fourth, at which time indeed the Republick had taken the whole Dutchy of *Ferrara*, by the Instigation of the *Pope* himself; but he being Friends with the Duke, commanded them to restore what they had taken, which they refusing to do, he fulminated his Excommunication and Interdict; but a Peace following, the Republick kept by agreement the *Pole-sine* of *Rovigo*: The Third Interdict

dict was in 1505. under *Julius* the Second, because the Republick had several Cities of *Romania* in their possessions, and the last of all was now lately under *Paul* the Fifth: So that if the *Popes* shewed such a concern for the thing when it was only belonging to the Dukes of *Ferrara*, much more would they do it now when the profit would be their own: So that we may believe that as to this they do own a Title, and have likewise inclination enough to regain this bit of Territory that is lopp'd off from them. We are therefore to consider what Facility they have to do it; and I do not believe that ever of themselves they will kindle the fire, but make advantage of one ready kindled by some other, as it happened under *Julius* the Second: Nay, if they reflect upon the great Rule of preserving the Liberty of *Italy*, they will not for so small a matter enter

ter into a League against the Republick; for it is of greater concern to them not to break the Ballance of Dominion in *Italy*, lest the *Tramontani* should take advantage of it, and subdue all.

But this very Reason was strong in Pope *Julius* the Second's time, and yet was without Effect in a Mind bent all upon particular Interest; wherefore I conclude, that we are not to expect greater Temper in the Modern *Popes*, but ought to rest satisfied, that if a powerful Foreign Prince should promise them the acquisition of the State of the Republick, they would embrace the motion without delay.

To the Third Question, I say, That the Republick might have just Reason to make themselves amends for the Country they lost in *Romagna*, it not being a thing they had usurp'd from the Church, but a voluntary Dedition of those Cities who were tyranniz'd over by
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little Tyrants, that had taken occasion from the Negligence of *Popes* to make themselves Masters of those places : They were yielded up by the Republick, to take off *Julius* the Second, who was the great Fomentour of the Fire which was kindled against the *Venetians* in the League of *Cambray*, where the Forces of all the Princes of *Christendom* were united against them ; and without doubt, upon good circumstances the Republick might justifie the re-taking of these Towns ; and I believe there is Inclination enough to do it, all Princes being willing to extend their Territories ; but the point is the Facility of doing it, which I think altogether remote ; for all other *Italian* Princes, if not out of conscience, yet out of Ostentation of Religion, would be backward to fall upon the Church ; and except it should happen that some one of them should grow too powerful for
all

all the others united, and so be able to right himself, I think the State of the Church need not fear being lessen'd.

To the Fourth Question, I answer in the Negative, and do not believe that the Church would joyn with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Prince, except it were such a one as the Church had a pretence upon, and then they would keep all, which would not please the Republick: Besides, we ought to reflect upon the *Genius* of the *Popedom*, which being Elective, most commonly the *Popes* have no other aim than to keep all quiet, and preserve the general Respect of Princes towards them, that in that decrepit Age they may make their Families, their thoughts being far from enlarging a Dominion which they expect to leave every day; and in the mean time, all the ready Money, which else they might lay

lay up, would go upon projects of a very uncertain Event: And 'tis a wonderful thing that *Julius* the Second, being of a very mean Birth, should have had so great a Sence of the Publick Interest of the Church, as to forego all his private concerns, and take the Empty Praises of his Courtiers in payment for the loss of such real advantages as he might have made to his Family.

The last Query depends, in a great measure, upon the others. I do not think it would be easie to concert the Union of the *Pope* with other Princes, in order to attack the Republick, because it will never be advantageous to the Church to increase the power of that other Prince; neither will it look like the Justice they profess, to take to themselves alone the Spoils, except it be upon a Country on which they have a pretence: 'Tis true, that in those noysie Excommunications

munications where they deprive Princes of their Dominions, and give them to others that can take them, there might be some danger; but they are seldom practiz'd but in an Attempt made by a Prince upon the Church, which is never to be feared from the Piety and Moderation of the Republick. There is no doubt but the Church would enter into a League to hinder any progress of the Republick, particularly against any Dependant of theirs; and also in case the Republick attack'd some small Prince, the *Popes*, to affect the protection of the weak, would declare; but if the Republick had to do with a strong Prince, the Church would look on, for fear of greatning too much that Prince, the rather, because the Republick can lay claim to none of those Old ticklish Titles which some other Princes might set a-foot against the Church. And so much for the *Pope*.
Now

Now let us come to the Emperour: The Republick must never forget that Maxim which is common to all Princes bordering upon the Empire, which is, *That it is not convenient for them to see the Emperour made more powerful, lest he renew those antiquated Titles he has to most Dominions near him, and particularly in Italy.*

The power of the *Roman Commonwealth*, which extended almost over all the known World, being at last usurp'd by *Julius Cæsar*, and from him deriv'd to a long *Series* of succeeding Emperours, might give the *German Emperour* a pretext to reckon with all the Princes of *Europe*, if he were strong enough; and perhaps many who wear Crowns, would be reduc'd to Beggary; therefore 'tis best to keep him in his cold Country of *Germany*, where mens Spirits are benumm'd, and less undertaking. The Republick has
Reason

Reason to distrust him upon many Heads ; as' Emperour he has pretences upon the Dutchy of *Frioul*, and the *Marca Trevisana* , besides the Cities of *Trevisa*, *Padoua*, *Vicenza* and *Verona*: As Arch-Duke, he pretends to *Istria*: As King of *Hungary*, to *Zara*, and the neighbouring Country: So that his Titles and Neighbourhood are considerably dangerous ; all these Countries are besides of greater Antiquity than the City of *Venice* it self: So that their being subject to a *Metropolis* of a younger standing, gives some suspicion of the Lawfulness of their Subjection. All these pretences were renewed in the League of *Cambray* ; Therefore I think, without hesitation, I may pronounce, That it is the Interest of the Republick that the Emperour should be kept low ; both for General and Particular Reasons.

From these Reflections we may also conclude, that the Emperour to these Titles does not want Inclination to acquire a part of the Territories of the Republick; particularly it being yet a complaint of that Prince, of the little Respect show'd him by the Republick, when taking advantage of his Distractions, they Erected the Fortrefs of *Palma Nuova* just under his Nose.

There remains therefore to see what Facility he might find in such an Attempt. In the present State of his Affairs, while the Faction of the *Protestants* is so strong in *Germany*, I cannot think that he can quarrel with the Republick, which is as powerful in Money as he is in Men: For in length of time 'tis certain, that he who has Money may have Men, and they who have many Men must consume much Money: 'Tis true, he being so near a Borderer upon the Republick,

lick, it may give him the more confidence, because a lesser Number will be necessary to make the Invasion; but if the Enterprize be not in the Name of the whole Empire, in which case the whole *German* Nation would be a party, I believe, with the help of his own Patrimonial Dominions, he will not do any great matter, the rather, because many great Heretical Princes and Cities of *Germany* have the same Interest to keep him low: So that as he might perhaps be pretty smart upon an Invasion or Incurfion, at length of time he would prove as weak to hold out a War: And indeed this was the true cause of Erecting the Fortrefs of *Palma Nuova*, to obviate a sudden Incurfion of his Forces, and provide a Retreat for the Country-people; so to gain time, which is always as advantageous to the Republick, as dangerous to such an Enemy, who if he have not some body to furnish

him with Money, will get but little ground, tho his Army be numerous, as it was in the time of *Maximilian*.

Now whether the Republick has any Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire any part of the Emperour's Territories? I answer, That without doubt the Republick has pretences upon *Goritia* and *Gradisca*, which formerly belong'd to the Family of the *Frangipani*, and for a little while was under the Government of the Republick: There are likewise some Castles in *Istria*, and upon the Coast which the Republick claims; and for an Inclination to acquire these, we need not doubt but the Republick has it, it being either the Vertue or Vice of Princes never to be without it: But still the great consideration lies in the Facility of doing it; for if there be that, 'tis above half the Title; and if that is wanting, 'tis Imprudence to own any part of a pretence that must

must remain without Execution. I believe by Sea it would prove easie to take *Trieste*, and some other places, but it would be as hard to maintain them; and to go further into the Land, would need great preparatives on the side of the Republick: whereas on the Emperour's side, the Defence would be easie, he having a command of Men: So that except in an open War, there is no thinking of any strong Attempt that way, and then it were not amiss to put a good strength to it, that at the end of the War, which always must one time or another be succeeded by Peace, some of the Country might remain by Treaty in the *Venetians* Hands, for the charges of the War; for to begin a War only for the acquisition of these places, would not be a Deliberation befitting the Wisdom and Gravity of the *Venetian* Senate: It would be better to watch the occasion of some Ex-

tremity or Pinch of an Emperour, which often happens, and buy these places; but then be aware that if it be not a Patrimonial Estate, the consent of the Dyet is necessary to the purchase, to cut off all claims in time to come.

'Tis as hard, that the Emperour should unite with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Prince in *Italy*, because, first, for *Spain*, they are the same Family with the Emperour; Against the Church he will declare as little, professing a great Zeal for it, and calling himself, *The Churches Advocate*; *Modena*, *Mantoua* and *Mirandola* are Fiefs of the Empire; *Savoy* and *Florence* are remote from him, and to come at them he must overcome greater Princes that are between him and them: so that this Union would prove difficult. If the Emperour should fall out with some of these Dukes, his Vassals, and depose them, it might happen
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that if *Spain* were busie elsewhere, and the Emperour loth to take the trouble of chastising them himself alone, he might then unite with the Republick, upon condition to have the best part of the Spoil; but if the Emperour should, as formerly, come to a great Rupture with the Church, and employ heartily his power in the Quarrel, 'tis not impossible but he might be willing to engage the Republick by a promise of some part of the conquest. I think in any other way 'tis not probable to make any advantage of the Imperial Assistance.

The last Question is, *Whether he can unite with others against the Republick?* And of this there is no doubt: For if *Maximilian*, tho infinitely oblig'd to the Republick, made no difficulty to unite in a League with *Lewis* the Twelfth of *France*, his Competitor and Enemy, whom, for Injuries received, he had

declared a Rebel to the Sacred Empire (tho *Lewis* laugh'd at that Imaginary Jurisdiction): I say, if he could submit to joyn with so suspected a power, much less would the Emperour now scruple the uniting either with *Spain* or the *Pope*, or any other Princes of *Italy*, not only for to acquire Territory, but even for bare Money, if it were offer'd him. With *France* I believe the Union would not be so easie as it was then, because now the Emperour, being partial for *Spain*, if their Interest did not concur, they would hinder him from being drawn away by any hopes or promises: But this will appear better when we come to treat of *Spain*: For if *Spain* will have a League against the Republick, the Emperour will never stand out.

Now let us come to *France*:

'Tis not above Fifty years ago that the Republick thought themselves

selves oblig'd not only to desire, but to procure the Greatness of *France*, because being under the phrensie of a Civil War, it threatned little less than the dissolution of that Monarchy: The Succession of *Henry* the Fourth to the Crown, who had his Title from Nature, and the Possession from his Sword, reviv'd it, and at last gave it such vigour, that from deserving Compassion, it came to move Envy; and if a fatal blow of a mean hand had not cut off that Prince's Life, and Designs, there would have been requisite great Dexterity, or great Force to defend the Republick from them. The *Count de Fuentes*, Governour of *Milan*, us'd to brag, that he had such Musick as should make those dance who had no mind to't: *Henry* the Fourth might have said so with much more reason, and he us'd to affirm, That at the pass things were, the Neutrality of the Republick was a Coyn that would no long-

er be current. If he had given career to his no ill-founded Designs, half a World would not have suffic'd him ; but we must not be frightened if we see the Raging Sea swell in Billows, and look as if it would swallow up the Earth, since a little Sand stops all its Fury. *Death* has a Scythe that most commonly cuts off all the Noblest Lives : If *Henry* the Third of *France*, had brought the Siege of *Paris* to an end ; if *Philip* the Second had not had the Winds and Seas against him, *England* would have been in Chains, and *Paris* would have been a Village. In conclusion, the Fatality of Humane Affairs is such, that most great undertakings are disappointed by unexpected causes. At present the constitution of *France* is such, that there is little danger from them ; for during the Minority of their King, they will have enough to do not to lose ground, there being so many Jealousies and Factions afoot:

foot: 'Tis true, that the common people have open'd their Eyes, and begin to be weary of spending their blood for the ambition of the great ones; and amongst these, the chiefest are old, and at their ease, so that they will think chiefly of keeping themselves in those Posts they enjoy. The Duke of *Maine*, who is Head of the *Catholick* Party, is very ancient and very rich; wherefore if in the time of the great troubles, he either could not or would not aspire to make himself King, when even he had all but the Name of it, 'tis not to be imagined he thinks of it now; and if he will be content with the State of a Subject, he is as great as he can be. The Duke of *Mercœur*, who in his Wife's right pretended to Erect *Britany* into a Kingdom, is at last dead in *Hungary*; the Duke of *Epernon* is more studious of good Husbandry than Soldiery; the Duke of *Montpensier* has always been true to the Royal Family; the *Capricious*
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of the Marchioness of *Aumale*, will hardly have any Followers ; and it will be well if she can clear her self of the late King's Death : On the other side, the Prince of *Conde*, the first Prince of the Blood, is young, and of a mild Nature ; he has besides before his Eyes the Example of his Father, Grandfather, and Great Grandfather, who all perish'd unfortunately in civil Broils, and has in his own person experimented the *Spanish Parsimony*, in his Retreat from Court to *Brussels* : So that if he desires a greater Fortune, he may compass it in *France*, from the hands of the Queen her self, who is so ill a *Politician*, as to try to put out Fire with pouring Oyl upon it. The *Hugonots* are weary ; the Duke of *Bouillon*, their Head, well pleased with his present Fortune ; and if he have a mind to be a *Hugonot* out of Perswasion, and not Faction, there is no body will hinder him ; but most of these great men have Religion only
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for a pretext, as 'tis reported likewise of the Duke *de Lesdiguières*; which if it be true, they will never be quiet till the King be of Age; and by consequence, there will be little protection to be hop'd for from that Kingdom. Our Speculation therefore may more certainly conclude, that the Greatness of *France* is at a stand, and cannot in the space of some years make any progress, and till it come to an Excess not to be thought on for these fifty years, it can give no Jealousie to the Republick.

As to the Title, Inclination and Facility that *France* may have to acquire any part of the Republick's Dominions; I say, we need not doubt of their Inclination, because Princes are like Wolves to one another, always ready for prey. As for Title, they can set up none till they have conquer'd the Dutchy of *Milan*; and Facility they have as little, because they cannot come at the
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Republick's Territories, without first passing over those of other Princes, which they will never consent to, lest they prove the first conquest themselves: Whereupon I conclude, that for a long time the power of *France* can give no jealousy to the Republick.

And on the other side, the Republick can have no pretences, as things stand, upon any part of the *French* Territories, as long as they are totally Excluded from *Italy*; and if there be no Title, there is less Inclination and Facility.

The Union of *France* with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Prince, will always be easie when *France* is in a condition to mind such acquisitions; the past Examples prove that sufficiently; but they do sufficiently bear Testimony likewise of the danger of such Union: Now that the *French* are totally excluded *Italy*, they would agree to very large conditions with the Republick,

publick, and allow them a great share of the Kingdom of *Naples* and Dutchy of *Milan*; but they would no sooner have made the acquisition of their share, but they would begin to cast their Eyes upon that of the Republick, and enter into a League against them with some other Prince, just as it happened in the time of *Lewis* the Twelfth, when to gain *Cremona*, he was the first that consented to the League of *Cambray*, deceiving all the while the *Venetian* Ambassador at Court, and affirming (even with Oaths), That he would never conclude any thing to the prejudice of the Republick, tho he had sign'd the League above six weeks before the War began, which he exercised likewise in a most barbarous manner, hanging up the Noble *Venetians* that were Governours of the Towns he took.

I believe *France*, to get footing in *Italy*, would engage with any other Prince against the Republick, except
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with the *Spaniard* ; and if that should happen , it would be necessary to stir up the Factions of that Kingdom, and bring upon them some powerful Neighbour, such as *England* : The Friendship of *Savoy* would likewise be useful, to hinder the Passes of the Mountains , and make some diversion in *Provence* and *Dauphine* , if there could be any relying upon this present Duke ; but he is a *Proteus*, that turns himself into many forms, and with his *Capricio's* and Humours, would soon empty the Treasures of *S. Marc* : But these are things so remote, that they may be left to the prudence of those who shall live in those times ; for according to the Times there must be alteration of Councils. And so much for *France*.

Now let us turn to *Spain*,

A Family that from low beginnings, is come by Marriages to the possession of Twelve Kingdoms, and several Dukedoms in *Europe*, besides
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what it has in the *Indies*, does certainly evidence a great Favour of Fortune, joyn'd with great application and industry; So that if it be not stopp'd by Fatality, may bid fair for an Universal Empire: If *Charles* the Fifth had had as much prudence in his youth as he had in his old Age, he would not have separated the Empire from *Spain*, but would have made his Son *Philip* have been chosen King of the *Romans*, instead of his Brother *Ferdinand*: He understood his Errour, and repented of it at last, trying to perswade *Ferdinand* to a Renunciation; but he shew'd as much prudence in keeping what he had got so wonderfully into his Hands, as *Charles* would have shew'd folly in going to deprive him of it by Force. *Charles* was not less unhappy in the other Act of Moderation he shew'd, when he rencunc'd all his Kingdoms to his Son, and retired to a private Life; For to one
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who on the Anniversary Day of that Famous Action, congratulated King *Philip* for his Felicity, he answered, That Day was likewise the Anniversary of his Father's Repentance: So that Actions of Moderation in Princes, are but like that Insect called the *Ephemera*, which lives and dies the same day.

The Greatness of *Spain* is therefore to be suspected; it has Two Wild Beasts that follow it always close, one on one side, and the other on the other, which is the *Turk* by Sea, and *France* by Land; and besides that it has that Issue of *Holland*, as witty *Boccalini* calls it, which will sufficiently purge it of all its ill Humours; and it must be own'd, that all the *Spanish* Sagacity has not hindered them from following the Fable of the Dog, who forsook the Substance for the Shadow: For, for Forty years together, *France* was sufficiently taken up with their own Intestine Broils, during

during which time *Spain* might with great advantage have made a Truce with *Holland*; and having likewise humbled the *Turk*, by the Battle of *Lepanto*, they might have applied their whole Force to *Italy*, which had no Defence but its own Natives, and not of them above half: So that in all probability they could have met with no considerable opposition.

One might say, That it was an Effect of King *Philip's* Moderation, if he had not shew'd as great an Ambition of Dominion as possible, in endeavouring first to unite *France* to *Spain* by conquest, then to have his Daughter chosen Queen, and lastly, seiz'd upon as many Towns as he could; Therefore we may give the *Italians* Joy, that half an Age of so much danger passed without the least loss of their Liberty. Now by reason of the *French King's* Minority, the
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Jealousies against *Spain* are a-foot again, but, I think, not with so much ground; For if not *France*, at least *England*, would raise their old Enemies, the *Dutch* particularly, if the *Italians* should help with Money: So that if *Italy* can but resist the first brunt, it may hope for all sort of Relief; for *France* has Forces, and they would soon have a will to succour *Italy* against *Spain*: Neither do I believe, that *Spain* would hazard the Truce with *Holland*, it having been compass'd with such Difficulties, even to the loss of much of their Honour and Fast. 'Tis enough, that to all other Christian Princes, except the Emperour, the Greatness of *Spain* is of ill Consequence; And therefore to be opposed by all secret means first, and if need be, at last openly, and without a Mask.

If *Spain* has any Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire part of
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the Republick's Dominions, there will be little Difficulty to answer: Their Title would be upon *Brescia*, *Crema*, and *Bergamo*, ancient Members of the Dutchy of *Milan*: And these Three Cities are so considerable, that with their Territory, they would perhaps make up as rich a Dutchy as any in *Lombardy*, except *Milan*: So that we need not doubt, but the *Spaniard* looks upon these Cities with an Amorous Eye, and with great Desire to enjoy them; there remains only the Facility of doing it, which is always the most important of the Three Points: Upon this Subject we must distinguish whether they will make the Attempt by themselves, or in Conjunction with others: If alone, and that the Republick have any Great Prince, either *Italian*, or Foreigner on their side, they will meet with little Facility in their Designs, because the Republick's

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Money , joyn'd to the Forces of another Prince, can give check to almost any great Power, and particularly to that of *Spain* , whose States and Possessions are large, but disunited ; and they cannot but be afraid, that while they are busied in *Lombardy* , others would try to attack them in a more sensible part : If *Spain* should therefore unite with any other Prince, provided the Republick had *France* on their side , they would not much hurt it, because the Inundation of the *French* into *Lombardy* , uses to be both powerful and sudden , provided they be called in by an *Italian* Prince of some Figure ; and by that means the *Spaniard* being attack'd on Two sides, would go near to lose his Dutchy of *Milan*.

But if we consider the Republick united only with some *Italian* Prince, and the *French* to stand Spectator, as might happen in the
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Minority of a *French* King, particularly if the *Spaniard* had the Pope and Emperour of his side, I doubt the Republick would be hard set; for that other Prince in League with them, cannot be of any great Force; the most useful would be *Savoy*; but besides, that he would be bought very dear, he would be always wavering, if the *Spaniards* tempted him strongly: The Richest would be *Florence*; but his Territories not joyning upon those of the Republick, there is little good to be expected from his assistance. Lastly, If *Spain* will fall upon the Republick alone, and the Republick be likewise alone, I say, That as to the State of *Terra Firma*, it would go near to be lost; but by Sea the Republick would make a stout Resistance.

But if it be ask'd, whether the Republick have either Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire any
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part of the *Spanish* Dominions in *Italy* ? I answer, the Title would be upon *Cremona* in *Lombardy*, and upon *Travi*, and other Ports of *La Puglia*, in the Kingdom of *Naples*, the Republick having been in Possession of all these places before ever *Spain* had footing in *Italy* : So that there wants nothing but Facility ; and there is but one Case that I know in which the Republick might hope to get Possession again ; and that is, in case the Republick were in League with *France*, and the Emperour busied by the *Protestants* of *Germany*, then some of these Expectations might be fulfilled, but still with the same Jealousie, that your Friends should at last joyn with your Enemies to fall upon the Republick, as it happened in the League of *Cambray*. And this answers the other Question, to wit, *Whether Spain can unite with any other Power against the Republick* ? 'Tis very true, that I can hardly believe, that the *Spaniards* would,

would, without any precedent broil, attempt a League with *France* against the Republick, because the Damage of one City's remaining in the *French* Hands, would be greater to them than the profit of taking all the Republick has in *Terra Firma* would amount to.

Whether the *Spaniard* may unite with the Republick, to acquire conjointly in *Italy*; I say, That if it be against an *Italian* Prince, they will not, because it is not their Interest that the Republick should be greater, and already almost all the lesser Princes are Dependants of that Monarchy: and as for the Pope, they would certainly help him, rather than joyn against him, being us'd to make a great shew of their protecting the Church: The only case that would make them bear patiently any new Acquisitions of the Republick, would be, if *France* should make any progress in *Italy*.

After all, amidst so many well-grounded suspicions, it must be confessed, that the Neighbourhood of *Spain* has prov'd of less disturbance to the Republick, than that of any other Prince who had those Countries before them; for the Dukes of *Milan* were perpetually either quarrelling, or, finding themselves too weak, were inciting of other Powers under-hand against the Republick.

There may be an Union likewise of the Republick and *Spain* by Sea, against the *Turk*, and by Land against the *Grisons*, or any other *Hetericks*. And this is enough for *Spain*.

Now by reason of Vicinity, we will speak of the other *Italian* Princes: It would be the Interest of the Republick to see them greater, if it could be done at the Expence of *Spain*, and by their Spoils, as also by getting from the Church: But both those Cases are next to impossible

sible, if first the World be not turn'd topsy turvy, which can never be, but by a League with *France*; and then if any part of the *Spaniards* Dominions could be shar'd amongst them, it would not injure the Republick at all: but for any of these Princes to grow great by spoiling one another, I should not like it; for the advantage would be inconsiderable, and in the mean time the fire would be kindled in *Italy*, the property of which is to go not where you would have it, but often where you are most afraid of it.

Whether any of these Princes have Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire from the Republick, the consideration will be short, because Facility will be wanting. *Mantoua* has some pretences upon *Valesa* and *Peschiera*; *Modena* upon the Town of *Este*, from whence the Family comes: But all these little Princes united without the Pope and *Spain*, could hardly give a disturbance to the Re-

publick, because the Two powerful-
 left of them, to wit, *Savoy* and *Flo-*
rence, are not immediate Border-
 ers.

Whether the Republick have ei-
 ther Title, Inclination or Facility to
 acquire from them in the State they
 now are in ; I answer, That the
 House of *Este* not having *Ferrara*,
 the Republick has no Title to either
Modena or *Reggio* : There would in-
 deed be a good Inclination against
Mantoua, because he lies, as it were,
 in the Bowels of the Republick ; but
 there would be but an ill Title, ex-
 cept the Republick should bear the
 Charges of his Education, while
 they were his Guardians ; and then
 the Facility would be small ; for no
 sooner would the Republick have be-
 gun the Dance, but others would
 come in, and perhaps it would not
 end as it begun. Of the other Prin-
 ces I have little to say, the Republick
 having had no disputes with them ;
 for the *Genoveses*, who formerly set
 the

the Republick so hard, have done as the Horse in the Fable, lost their own Liberty, in hopes of being victorious of their Enemies, and are by that means out of power to hurt the Republick.

As for Leagues these Princes will be ready to make them either with or against the Republick, because their Fortune, as Princes, being but small, they will let slip no occasion of mending it, either by acquisition of new Territory, or by receiving Subsidies and Pensions. *Florence* only would hardly be mov'd by that last motive, because he is not needy, being at this time perhaps the Richest Prince in ready Money that is in Christendom; and his Riches always increase, because the Princes of that Family do yet retain their Ancestors Inclination to Merchandize, and that enriches the Prince without damage to the Subject. The Dominions of the great Duke are considerable, as well because they are placed

as it were in the Navel of *Italy*, with a fertile Territory, all united together, as also because the States of other Princes are, as it were, a Wall and Defence to it; and it is besides, to be valued by the Communication it has with the Sea by *Leghorn*, and some other *Maritime* Fortresses: So that if one were to reckon upon any *Italian* Prince, I know none that deserves so well, as being exempted from the temptation of being bought, and having yet some of that punctual mercantile Faith.

If the Republick will have a League with any of the other *Italian* Princes, there will be no difficulty in it, provided they pay them; but withal, one must not forget the witty Reflection of *Boccalini*, when the *Italian* Princes are willing to be taught manners out of the *Galateo*, provided that it may not look like ill breeding in them, to eat with both Jaws as fast as they can.

With

With *Poland* the Republick can have no other Concern than that of defending Christendom, and by some diversion from that Crown, bear the more easily the weight of the *Ottoman* Power: Therefore it would be well for the Republick to have that King and Kingdom grow more powerful. As for any thing else, the great distance that is between that State and the Republick, takes away all matter of any further Consideration. The same thing may be said of the *Moscovite*.

England being the greatest of those powers that are separated from the Church of *Rome*, is a Kingdom of great strength, particularly since the Union of *Scotland*; and the Kings of *England* have nothing left to desire as to Territory: All that Island is now under the Dominion of one sole Monarch, and has the Sea for a Wall: So that if *England* be not disunited within it self, there is no power to overcome it: We see the Example in

the Invasion of *Philip* the Second of *Spain* (and yet then the Union was not so great as might have been) who lost his mighty *Armada* that he had been so long preparing at such vast Expences. *Queen Elizabeth*, who has shew'd the World how far a Woman's ability can go in Government, did likewise enlarge her Dominions by Navigations to the *Indies*, and wounded *Spain* in that tender part ; She likewise had some Ports of the *Low-Countries* consign'd to her, so that she seem'd to be hardly contain'd in that separate World of hers. The Island is fertile and delicious, producing all necessaries for Life, and though the Natives go abroad and buy the Products of other Countries, it is more as Superfluities, and out of Luxury, than want, and amongst the rest, they have a Trade for Grapes called Currans, which they buy in the Dominions of the Republick. *Henry* the Eighth, who
was

was the King that Apostatiz'd from the Church of *Rome*, did use to concern himself in the Affairs of *Italy*, and several times the Popes have had good Protection from the ancient Kings of that Country, who were most devoted to the See of *Rome*; to say truth, Religion has had a great Loss, and the Court of *Rome* a greater, I cannot well say, whether out of the great Lust of *Henry* the Eighth, or the little consideration of *Clement* the Seventh, at present that King will not hear of *Rome*, and has but small Curiosity for the Affairs of *Italy*.

If this King could grow greater, it would be advantageous to the Republick, because it might obtain his Alliance, and by that means a greater respect from other Crown'd Heads; but however, even without this consideration, 'tis a Power to be courted, because the Nation having an ancient Antipathy to *France*, and a modern one

to *Spain*, it cannot but have a good inclination for the Republick. 'Tis true that the present King is more enclin'd to Wars with his Pen, than with his Sword, having a mighty Love for Disputes, and valuing himself upon the Character of a Notable Divine ; so much has the Quarrel with *Rome* influenc'd that Country, that even their Princes study Controversie ; but however I should not think the Republick ought to mind any of those Circumstances, because where there is strength, there is always hopes of making use of it, that depending only upon raising of Passions.

The best means would be (besides the continuation of those Offices already introduc'd of mutual Embassies) strictly to command the Governours in the *Levant* to shew all good usage to the *English* Merchants, and particularly observe punctually all Treaties and Engagements with them, because there is

no Nation that puts a greater value upon their Word than the *English* do, and the Kings of that Island have not yet learnt the modern Policy that gives them leave to break their Faith in order to reigning more absolutely.

With the Seven United Provinces 'twill be good to cultivate Friendship, and to encrease it by a mutual defensive League, particularly at this time, that the Truce is but newly concluded with *Spain*; for it will be a Curb upon the *Spaniard*, if he should attempt any thing against the Republick, for fear his old Wounds should be set a bleeding again, they being but just bound up, and not healed.

'Tis feasible likewise to procure something more of Trade with the *Hollanders*, because they are extremely ingenious, and addicted that way; and moreover, since both the Republicks stand in awe of the same Power, it will not be difficult

difficult to unite their inclinations ; and they have made on their side a sufficient Advance, by sending an Embassy to the Republick, which though of Complement, yet it has shew'd great esteem and inclination to an Union.

Besides the Advantage of a solid diversion of the Forces of *Spain*, there is another Essential consideration, which is, That from them might be had a considerable Body of well disciplin'd Soldiers, and that with admirable celerity, besides several Regiments that might be rais'd in a Country so well us'd to War, if there were occasion, and all the inconveniencies of Transportation are not to be valued ; for the Republick will always have a greater scarcity of good Soldiers, than of good Money.

With the Princes of *Germany* of a different Religion, there can hardly be any Concerns, if there is no room for Quarrels. As the
World

World stands now, if it be not well, they should grow greater, at least 'tis not amiss, they are already great enough, because they are a Check upon the Emperour, who else would be a most formidable Potentate to all Princes, but more particularly to the *Italians*, and more to the Republick, than to the rest of *Italy*; but now by their means his Power is not only balanced, but almost quite oppressed to the common benefit of other Princes. With these Princes it will be easie for the Republick to have an Engagement: First, because they know that the Republick is not a blind Adorer of the Interests of the Court of *Rome*: And, Secondly, because they see the Jealousies that are between the Republick and the Emperour, from whence they conclude, that there is no danger of a League between them and the Emperour, and by consequence, they have not the Republick for a suspected

ated Power; and upon all Occurrences, it will do well to shew an Inclination to Friendship with them, first, because they may make a potent diversion; and, secondly, because their Country being a Nursery of Soldiers, the Republick upon occasion may make Levies there; and it is a point of high importance for the Republick to be certain of their Levies; for in a time of need they can hope but for small help from the *Italian Militia*.

I have not yet said any thing of the Duke of *Bavaria*; and he is not to be omitted, being so much a dependant of the Emperour, from whom he has received the Electoral Dignity, upon the Exclusion of the Elector *Palatin*: This Prince has had the boldness to contest the Precedency with the Republick at the Council of *Trent*; and therefore no good Correspondency can be between him and the Republick. It
would

would not be amiss to see him less'n'd; for 'tis always to be wish'd, that he who has no good Intentions, should have as little power to offend as may be.

The Order of *Malta*, who are Pyrating Princes, is likewise to be minded; and their growth in Power can be of no use to the Republick: They do nothing but waken the *Ottoman* Power, when 'tis almost lull'd asleep; and therefore are dangerous: Their Friendship, in time of open War with the *Turk*, will be easily had, upon the Hopes of a good Booty.

It remains for us now to speak of the greatest Prince of this known World, formidable to all other Princes, I mean the *Turk*; but we cannot speak of him by the Rules we have laid down for the others; for with him all Arts and Policies are vain: He makes no League with any,

any, neither has he any Residing
 Embassadors in any Court, scorning
 to descend to inform himself of o-
 ther Princes Intrigues: He owns
 his Greatness, and relies upon it, like
 the Elephant, who by reason of his
 great strength, is never observed to
 use Cunning: Perhaps it may be an
Arcanum of the *Alchoran*, to hinder
 his Subjects from contracting the
 Manners and Customs of other Na-
 tions, and bringing them home at
 their return: Perhaps likewise that
 he is unwilling their Wits should be
~~refined~~ in Politicks: His is an Em-
~~pire~~ ~~built~~ upon the Ruin of all other
 Empires, founded in force, and
 scorning Titles and Claims of Ju-
 stice. If he can acquire a Country,
 he has always Right to it; and
 when he has conquer'd it, he assumes
 all the power to himself, suffering
 no Usurpations where he himself u-
 surps all: His Ministers make open
 profession of Ignorance, which is
 propagated industriously amongst
 his

his people, who are sufficiently learned, if they know how to obey: They are told openly of their Slavery, and it is expected they learn the Obligations of it: not but that they will dispute with Christians for their Emperour, and alledge, That he succeeds to all the Rights of *Constantine*, whose City he has conquered. In his Religion the Prince is loose, and the *Mufti*, which is the High Priest, tied up, who must speak complacently to the Ends of the Government, and in conformity to the Will of him that rules, or pay his disobedience with his Life. In this Monarchy all the Qualities of the Mind, both speculative and practick, are despised and suspected, which made one of their Emperours send back the Musicians sent him by *Francis* the First, lest with their Harmony they should have molified the Iron Temper of those fierce Natures: They value strength of Body, and the Arts of War, in which none are
soon-

sooner preferr'd than those who shew the greatest Fierceness and Inhumanity in their dispositions: They are intent upon conquering the rest of the World, and in order to it they have infinite Numbers of Men, and infinite Treasure: His yearly Revenue exceeds Twenty Millions of Crowns; he inherits the Estates of all his Subjects, whose Children can lay claim to nothing but their Father's Horse and Arms. In the midst of all these Riches his thirst of Gold still increases: so that often his Fury is laid with the Charms of that Metal: Out of that has been said, *'Tis evident that his Greatness must be the Ruine of all other Powers, and that it would be an unspeakable Felicity to see him lessen'd; but the hopes of that are so remote, that they are next to impossible.*

As for any Title upon the Territories of the Republick, he can have none; Inclination and Facility he has but too much, designing the Ruine

ine of all Christendom ; and considering the Disunion of Christians, more intent upon Jealousies at home than upon an Union against a Foreign Invader, his Design is not above his Force : He fears nothing but an Union of Christendom against him ; and that he may not be negligent in providing against it, that cunning and wicked *Mahomet* has left him a Prophecy to keep him awake, by which, the Ruine of his Empire is to come from such an Union : The *Turks* never mention it but with Cries and Groans ; and the Government strives to avoid it by being invincible, not considering, that if the Prophecy be true, 'tis unavoidable. As for the Republick, he is a terrible Neighbour to them, always encroaching, and setting no bounds to his pretences, till he has swallowed all.

The Republick, on the other side, cannot want a Title against him ; for what he has taken from them, would
make

make up a great Principality : *Cyprus, Negrepont, Modon, Coron, Caramania, all the Archipelago, Boffina, Scutari, Albania*, part of the very Imperial City of *Constantinople*, and in short, half his Empire in *Europe* has been at several times extorted from the Republick : but to get any of this back is the difficulty ; and 'twill be well if he is content with what he has, and that we can save what remains. The only good thing the Republick can hope for, is, that the *Turk* will not enter into League with any other against the Republick, because he scorns all Leagues : 'Tis true, that in the time of *Lodovico Sforza*, Duke of *Milan*, he was by him drawn to invade the Republick, and before that, by the *Visconti*, Dukes of *Milan*, likewise with promise to busie the *Venetians* in *Italy*, by a War on his side : 'Tis said also, That *Lewis* the Twelfth strove to draw him into the League of *Cambray* : But all these are rather
 Sub-

Subornations than Leagues, and spurring of a Horse that's free enough of his own Nature.

He would easily unite with the Republick, to conquer other Princes ; but then the Republick must reckon, that he would take all to himself, he not understanding any Accounts of dividing : So that it would only be a madness, and by ones own Expence of Blood and Treasure, promote his Tyrannical Empire. The *Turk* has often offered Succours to the Republick in their Wars with others ; but our wise Ancestors always disliked such a Protector, but were glad he did not take the opportunity of their Troubles to fall upon them.

There is no other Politicks to be used with this Empire, than to profess Friendship, and reckon upon sudden Enmity ; and therefore be always provided, that the weakness of the State may not be an Invitation to him to use his Natural Rapacity ;

ty; for the Peace will be always the longer, when the readiness for War shall be visible.

In case of a Rupture, one should try to make a diversion by the King of *Persia*, the *Moscovite* and the *Pole*: but that will be a long uncertain business, and of slow benefit; to corrupt the Ministers of the Port in open War, will be a very hard thing, they will rather suffer a temptation in time of Peace, and by that means one may penetrate their Designs, and retard their Deliberations, provided the person gain'd be of the *Divan*, and particularly the *Grand Vizier*, if possible; but they often take Bribes, and deceive one; besides, their being subject to continual Changes, and those very sudden, according to the Emperour's *Capricio*, and the Calumnies of their Competitors, the Friendship of the *Queen Mother*, and of the Wife of the *Grand Signior*, as also of the *Musti*, may help: But if the Prince himself be
of

of a resolute Nature, their Offices will be but weak: And all violent sudden Resolutions of War made by the Emperour himself, are always welcome to the *Fanizaries*, who are the Soul of that Empire: So that, as I said at first, I must conclude, That Prudence and Politicks can be of little use against Rage and Fury, and a Nation that depends not upon Reason, but upon Might.

I can say nothing then but what the Angel said to *Gideon*, *Comfortare & esto Robustus*; and with this good *Omen* that comes from Heaven, and which I offer with a most affectionate Mind,

I take leave, having accomplish'd the Task was impos'd upon me, if not according to the full Extent of my Duty, at least in proportion to my weak Forces, and small Talent.

F I N I S.